The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine: Inequitable Results are Threatened but Not Inevitable by Gill, Adam
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 24 | Number 3 Article 4
1-1-2002
The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine: Inequitable
Results are Threatened but Not Inevitable
Adam Gill
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Adam Gill, The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine: Inequitable Results are Threatened but Not Inevitable, 24 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 403
(2002).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol24/iss3/4
The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine:
Inequitable Results Are Threatened But
Not Inevitable
by
ADAM GILL
I. Introduction and Background ................................................. 407
A . Trade Secret Law Generally .......................................... 407
B. The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine .............................. 408
C . The Pepsico Case ............................................................ 410
D . California and the ID D .................................................. 412
E. Employee Mobility and California Business and
Professions Code Section 16600 .................................... 415
F. Other Jurisdictions and the IDD ................................... 416
II. The IDD and Its Increasing Use ............................................. 417
A. The IDD Allows Employers to Jump the Gun in
Protecting Trade Secrets ................................................ 418
B. The IDD Can Be Used as a Sword Instead of a Shield
........................................ 419
C. The IDD Imposes an Unanticipated Noncompete
A greem ent ....................................................................... 420
D. The IDD Makes Non-Disclosure Agreements a Catch-
22 in U nsettled D istricts ................................................. 420
E. The Doctrine of Negative Trade Secrets Exacerbates the
Problem s of the ID D ...................................................... 421
F. The IDD Hinders Employee Mobility and Innovation
........................................................................................... 4 2 2
III. Proposals for Application of the IDD .................................... 423
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2002. The author
would like to thank Professor Margreth Barrett, Valerie Wagner, and Jose Luis Martin for
their guidance and support in the development of this note. The author would also like to
thank Christina and John Gill for their unending encouragement, support, and love,
without which the creation of this note would not have been possible.
404 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. [24:403
A. The IDD Should Be Specifically Defined and Narrowly
A pplied ............................................................................. 423
B. Alternative Remedies ..................................................... 424
C. Compensating Enjoined Employees ............................. 424
D. Lenient Restoration of Trade Secret Status ................ 425
E. Ongoing Discovery Obligations .................................... 425
F. Punitive Damages ........................................................... 425
IV . C onclusion ................................................................................. 426
Many employers today face the critically important problem of
preventing trade secret misappropriation by departing employees.1
This is a result of several factors. First, intellectual property is
becoming an increasingly valuable part of corporate assets. Second,
as the importance of intellectual property is on the rise, so is
employee mobility and turnover.2  Additionally, trade secret
protection is fragile, and only exists as long as the protected
information remains a secret.3  Once the secret is out, it is not
recoverable.! This combination presents employers with an
increasing problem of protecting themselves from departing
employees who take valuable trade secrets with them when they
leave. Compounding the problem for many employers is that direct
evidence of misappropriation is rare, so a trade secret claim can be
very difficult to prove. For example, if an employee leaves a job and
takes a trade secret customer list to use at a new job, it would be
difficult for her previous employer to prove whether she contacted a
customer legitimately, or whether she had illegally used
misappropriated information.
However, employers do have legal protection. The Uniform
Trade Secret Act (UTSA), which has been adopted in the vast
majority of states,5 including California,6 allows courts to enjoin actual
or threatened misappropriation. In recent years, companies have
increasingly and successfully sought injunctions for threatened
misappropriation.7  Some employers have successfully enjoined
1. A study by the American Society for Industrial Security International showed a
323 percent increase in reported trade secret theft since a similar survey only four years
prior. Susan Street Whaley, Student Author, The Inevitable Disaster of Inevitable
Disclosure, 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 809 (1999).
2. A recent study done by the American Management Association shows the
overall annual employee turnover rate in American businesses to be over sixteen percent.
The numbers are much higher in technology companies, which have an annual turnover
rate of twenty-five percent. David Essex, Employee Turnover, the Costs Are Staggering
<http://www.itworld.com/Career/1993/ITW2491/> (Sept. 11, 2000).
3. Uniform Trade Secrets Act 1(4) (amended 1985).
4. FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Giant Industrial Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984).
5. Whaley, supra n.1, at 809 n.3 (listing some form of UTSA adoption in forty-two
states and the District of Columbia).
6. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.2(a) (2001).
7. See e.g. Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 987
S.W.2d 642 (Ark. 1999); Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1197, 1216, (Utah 1998); Solutec Corp., Inc. v. Agnew, 88 Wash. App. 1067, (Div. 3
1997); APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852, 857 (N.D. Iowa 1997);
Southwestern Energy Co. v. Eickenhorst, 955 F. Supp. 1078, 1085 (W.D. Ark. 1997);
National Starch & Chem Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31 (N.J. App. 1997); La
Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523, 531 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith,
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former employees from working for a competitor, arguing that the
new employment will lead to the "inevitable" disclosure of the former
employer's trade secrets.8  This inevitable disclosure doctrine
("IDD") has received a lot of attention since the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond.9 In Pepsico, the Seventh Circuit
upheld an injunction that prevented a former Pepsico executive from
assuming his duties in a new job with a competitor, finding that his
new position would inevitably lead him to rely on Pepsico's trade
secrets.'°
The IDD is not without its detractors. Critics of the doctrine cite
its "all or nothing" results, and the inequities of its application."
Much of this criticism comes from the fact that the IDD, under the
umbrella of trade secret protection, enjoins employees from taking
new jobs not just when misappropriation has not been proven, but
when none has ever occurred. The doctrine has also been attacked
for conferring uncontemplated benefits on employers at the expense
of employees, and for doing so without consideration to the
employee.2
The IDD was recently rejected by the California Court of
Appeal in Schlage Lock Co. v. Whyte." Before Schlage Lock Co.,
there was no published California decision on whether the IDD
applied in California. 4 The California Court of Appeal had previously
adopted the IDD in Electro Optical Industries v. White, which was
subsequently ordered depublished by the California Supreme Court.'5
Several Federal district courts have addressed the issue using
California law and have split on whether the IDD applies in
California. 6
919 F. Supp. 624, 633-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Merck & Co. Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443,
1457 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Uncle B's Bakery, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405, 1435-36
(N.D. Iowa 1996).
8. See e.g. Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
9. Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1263; Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp.
2d 1111, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("The PepsiCo decision has given new life to the theory of
inevitable disclosure").
10. Id.
11. For a discussion of the problems of the IDD, see infra section II.
12. See infra section 11 (c).
13. 2002 WL 31040309 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Sept. 12, 2002).
14. See id. at *1.
15. Electro Optical Industries v. White, 76 Cal. App. 653 (2d Dist. 1999), ordered not
published, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 (April 12, 2000).
16. See Bayer, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 (holding that the IDD does not apply under
California law); Maxxim Med., Inc. v. Michelson, 51 F. Supp. 2d 773, 787 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
(adopting the IDD using California law and a Pepsico-like analysis); Danjaq LLC v. Sony
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The IDD does not have to be a doctrine with such all or nothing
consequences. California courts, in applying the doctrine, can and
should use other means to ensure that the IDD is applied fairly and
protects all of the legitimate interests. This note will examine the
IDD, its potential adoption in California, the potentially inequitable
consequences the doctrine, and will discuss ways that the courts can
mitigate the inequities that car result from its application. Part I
presents an introduction and background to trade secret law and the
IDD. Part II is a discussion of the IDD and its increasing use,
including the potential adoption of the IDD in California, and
highlights the potential pitfalls of the IDD's application. Part III
presents proposals for the potential future application of the IDD
that should be used to mitigate the problems of the doctrine.
I
Introduction and Background
A. Trade Secret Law Generally
The recognition of some form of legal action for trade secret
misappropriation can be traced back to the Roman Empire. 7 Actio
servi corrupti was a cause of action created by Roman courts to
protect slave owners from attempts to coerce or induce slaves into
disclosing their owners' confidential information." The remedy
available was twice the amount of actual damages."9 American courts
did not provide a damages remedy to the common law tort of trade
secret misappropriation until 1837, and the first injunction was not
issued until 1866.20
In 1979, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws published the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in an
effort to codify the common law, which was largely based on the First
Restatement of Torts.21  As noted, most states have codified their
Corp., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1638 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 1999) (holding that Pepsico is not
the law of California or the Ninth Circuit); Computer Sciences Corp. v. Computer
Associates Int'l, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21803 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1999) (following
Danjaq in holding that the IDD is not the law of California or the Ninth Circuit).
17. Merges, Robert et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 31
(2000).
18. Id. at 31-32.
19. Id. at 32.
20. Id. at 33.
21. Nathan Hamler, Student Author, The Impending Merger of the Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine and Negative Trade Secrets: Is Trade Secrets Law Headed in the Right
Direction?, 25 Iowa J. Corp. L. 383, 385 n. 15 (2000) (citing James Pooley, Trade Secrets §
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trade secret law through the adoption of the UTSA.22 The UTSA
defines a trade secret as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process that: i)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and ii) is
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
23
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
This broad definition includes any information that is of
potential economic value to the plaintiff, and that derives some of its
value from not being known to the public."
There must also be actual or threatened misappropriation in
order for injunctive relief to be available 5 Misappropriation is the
disclosure or use of another's trade secret without the holder's
express or implied consent, when, at the time of the disclosure or use,
that person knew or had reason to know that his or her knowledge of
the trade secret was acquired under circumstances giving rise to a
duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use. 6 Misappropriation occurs
when trade secret information is acquired through improper means or
through a breach of confidence.27 The usual remedy for trade secret
misappropriation is an injunction, although damages can be
awarded.28  In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction,
there are two factors a court must examine. 29  The first is the
likelihood that the requesting party will ultimately prevail on the
merits, and the second is a balancing of the harm that the requesting
party is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied against the harm to
the enjoined party if the injunction is granted."
B. The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
When actual misappropriation or overt threats to misappropriate
2.02[3] (1997)).
22. Whaley, supra n.1 at 809 n. 3 (listing some form of UTSA adoption in forty-two
states and the District of Columbia).
23. Uniform Trade Secrets Act 1(4) (amended 1985).
24. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d) (2001).
25. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.2 (2001).
26. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(b) (2001).
27. Merges, supra n.17 at 65.
28. David Essex, Moving to a New Job? Protect Yourself Against an Inevitable-
Disclosure Lawsuit <www.itworld.com/Career/1882/ITW2341/> (August 30, 2000).
29. IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, 35 Cal. 3d 63, 69 (1983).
30. Id.
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have not been alleged, some courts have used the IDD to find
threatened misappropriation, holding that disclosure is inevitable
when an untrustworthy former employee leaves, or when a former
employee could not help but use trade secret information in the
course of his new employment." The IDD should not create a new
action or remedy, but should be used as a way for the courts to
balance the evidence and considerations when deciding to issue an
injunction due to the threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.
The name of the doctrine stems from the courts finding that the
threatened misappropriation comes from inevitable disclosure of the
secrets, as opposed to misappropriation being literally threatened. To
explain the IDD in simpler terms, "a plaintiff may prove a claim of
trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that the defendant's
new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff's
trade secrets."33 The problem with this statement of the IDD is that it
encompasses a wide range of potential situations, but provides little
guidance on the standards to be used.
The IDD was first developed and used by an Ohio Court of
Appeals in B.F. Goodrich v. Wohlgemuth in 1963." In Wohlgemuth,
the defendant had worked in various positions for the plaintiff in its
pressure space suit division.35  Wohlgemuth had signed a
nondisclosure agreement with the plaintiff, but not an agreement not
to compete.36  After leaving employment with the plaintiff,
Wohlgemuth went to work as Technical Director for a competitor.37
Wohlgemuth was in possession of plaintiff's trade secrets and had
made statements that he would use knowledge from his previous
employment to benefit his new employer.38 The court held that there
was no remedy at law for the plaintiff,39 but did find two equitable
bases for issuing a permanent injunction. ' ° The court held that it was
a general rule of equity that:
31. Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1270-71; Maxxim Med., Inc. V. Michelson, 51 F. Supp. 2d at
785-87.
32. Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1270-71; see also Cal. Civ. Code 3426.2(a) (2001) ("Actual or
threatened misappropriation may be enjoined").
33. Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1268.
34. Mark Halligan, Threatened Misappropriation: The "Inevitable Disclosure"
Doctrine <http://execpc.com/-mhallign/doctrine.html> (accessed Feb. 15, 2001).
35. 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963).
36. Id. at 105.
37. Id. at 102.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 103.
40. Id. at 105.
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[I]f an employee gains knowledge of his employer's trade
secrets as a result of the confidential relationship existing
between employer and employee, and, in violation of the
confidence, discloses such secrets to competitors after the
termination of his employment, such abuse of confidence
may be enjoined."'
The court also held that the issuance of this injunction did not require
the presence of an agreement not to compete. 2
The Wohlgemuth court did not include a discussion of the
competing interests in the case, but instead dismissed the defendant's
right to work in his chosen field in one conclusory sentence, saying:
We have no doubt that Wohlgemuth had the right to take
employment in a competitive business, and to use his
knowledge (other than trade secrets) and experience, for the
benefit of his new employer, but a public policy demands
commercial morality, and courts of equity are empowered to
enforce it by enjoining an improper disclosure of trade
secrets known to Wohlgemuth by virtue of his
employment.43
It is notable that the court in Wohlgemuth did not cite any cases
in its decision, and that the entire opinion contained a total of two
citations (both were statutes defining "trade secret").
44
C. The Pepsico Case
A recent leading case that has sparked increased interest in and
use of the IDD is Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond . In Pepsico, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed a district court's issuance of a temporary injunction
that prohibited Redmond from working in his new job with a
competitor of his former employer. Redmond, a former Pepsico
executive who had knowledge of Pepsico's trade secrets and who had
signed a confidentiality agreement with Pepsico, accepted a job with
Quaker. At his new job, Redmond would be marketing a directly
competing sports drink. The trade secrets that Redmond knew from
his employment at Pepsico included its strategic plan, annual
operating plan, "attack plans" (marketing plans for specific markets),
and innovations in its selling and delivery systems.46 Pepsico argued
that it would not be possible for Redmond to refrain from using its
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 104.
45. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
46. Id. at 1265-66.
[24:403HASTINGS COMM/ENT LTJ
trade secret information in his new job."
The issue before the Seventh Circuit was whether the district
court correctly concluded that Pepsico had a reasonable likelihood of
success on its claims for trade secret misappropriation and breach of
the confidentiality agreement.48 The Pepsico court noted that cases
involving threatened misappropriation often revolve around a
recurring tension in trade secret law:
Trade secret law serves to protect "standards of commercial
morality" and "encourage invention and innovation" while
maintaining "the public interest in having free and open
competition in the maufacture and sale of unpatented
goods." Yet that same law should not prevent workers from
pursuing their livelihoods when they leave their current
positions.49
The court also- noted that this tension increases when the
misappropriation has only been threatened." The court then
discussed two cases in which injunctions based on the IDD had been
denied, concluding that "a plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret
misappropriation by demonstrating that the defendant's new
employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff's trade
secrets."51
The court turned next to the problem of deciding what
constituted "inevitable misappropriation."" The court dismissed the
idea that Quaker was going to use Pepsico's trade secrets to create its
own distribution systems or adopt Pepsico's ideas. Instead, the court
identified the inevitable disclosure as Quaker's ability "to anticipate
[Pepsico's] distribution, packaging, pricing, and marketing moves.""
The court also noted that "Redmond might be faced with a. decision
that could be influenced by certain confidential information that he
obtained while at Pepsico. ,14 The court used the analogy of a coach
who has had a player go to another team before the "big game" with
the playbook still in hand. However, the court had stated earlier in
its decision that "the mere fact that a person assumed a similar
47. Id. at 1266.
48. Id. at 1267.
49. Id. at 1268 (citations omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1268-69 (citing Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Commun. Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353
(N.D. 11. 1989); AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1987)).
52. Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1269.
53. Id. at 1270.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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position at a competitor does not, without more, make it 'inevitable
that he will use or disclose ... trade secret information."'56 The court
never clearly distinguished this proposition from its ruling in the
Pepsico case, leaving open the question of what constitutes inevitable
misappropriation.
In the time between Redmond's acceptance of Quaker's offer of
employment and his giving notice to Pepsico, he misrepresented
several things to Pepsico. Although the district court found this lack
of candor to be a factor in its decision, the court of appeals decision
did not rely on that finding." The court merely held that the district
court had not abused its discretion in considering Redmond's lack of
candor. In fact, concerning Redmond's lack of candor, the Court of
Appeals said, "[t]he facts of the case do not ineluctably dictate the
district court's conclusion," indicating that a lack of trustworthiness
could be considered, but was not necessary or conclusive. 9
The Pepsico Court also separately upheld (for the same reasons)
the decision of the district court that Redmond's position at Quaker
would cause him to violate his nondisclosure agreement with
Pepsico. 6 The agreement at Pepsico was therefore not essential to
the finding of inevitable misappropriation.
The holdings of Pepsico are: 1) "inevitable" disclosure of trade
secrets, even absent confidentiality agreements, may be enjoined; and
2) "inevitable" breaches of confidentiality agreements may also be
enjoined."
D. California and the IDD
Earlier this year, the California Court of Appeals rejected the
IDD in Schlage Lock Co. v. Whyte. In 1999, the court of appeal tried
to adopt it in Electro Optical Industries v. White,63 but that decision
was subsequently ordered depublished by the California Supreme
Court, leaving the decision completely without legal effect. 6 In its
56. Id. at 1269 (quoting AMP Inc., 823 F.2d at 1207).
57. Id. at 1264.
58. Id. at 1271.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 2002 WL 31040309 at *1.
63. See Electro Optical, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 653.
64. Cal. R. Ct. 977(a) ("An opinion of a [c]ourt of [a]ppeal or an appellate
department of the superior court that is not certified for publication or ordered published
shall not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action or proceeding...").
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adoption of the IDD, the Court of Appeal for.the Second District of
California gave surprisingly little consideration, saying only that
"[a]lthough no California court has yet adopted it, the inevitable
disclosure rule is rooted in common sense and calls for a fact-specific
inquiry. We adopt the rule here., 65 The court then stated the rule to
be that:
[A]n injunction may issue where the new employment is
"likely to result" in the disclosure of a former employer's
trade secrets, or where it would be "impossible" for an
employee to perform his or her new job without using or
disclosing those secrets.
66
Before Electro Optical, the doctrine had been both adopted and
rejected by different federal district courts in applying California
law.67
The issue of whether the IDD applies in California appears to be
settled, for the moment, by Schlage Lock Co. 68 Whyte was the vice
president of sales for Schlage, whose duties involved selling to large
warehouse stores like the Home Depot.69  Whyte signed a
confidentiality agreement and agreed to abide by their code of ethics,
which forbade disclosure of confidential information, but did not sign
a covenant not to compete. As part of his duties, Whyte participated
in sales meetings with the Home Depot and other large retailers.7" In
these meetings, Whyte presented confidential sales plans and other
confidential information. In June of 2000, Whyte left Schlage to work
for a competitor, where he would be selling to the same retailers.
Schlage contended that Whyte disavowed his confidentiality
agreement, stole trade secrets, and lied about returning company
information. Whyte denied the allegations, saying that he affirmed
the confidentiality agreement, and claimed that Schlage's president
vowed to destroy his career.
The court, in affirming the decision of the superior court below,
noted that the facts of the case were "strikingly similar" to the
65. Electro Optical, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 660.
66. Id. (quoting Air Prods. and Chems. Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114, 1120 (1982)).
67. See e.g., Bayer, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 (holding that the IDD does not apply
under California law); Maxxim Medical, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 787 (adopting the IDD using
California law and a Pepsico-like analysis); Danjaq, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1638 (holding
that Pepsico is not the law of California or the Ninth Circuit); Computer Sci. Corp., 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21803 (following Danjaq in holding that the IDD is not the law of
California or the Ninth Circuit).
68. 2002 WL 31040309 at *1.
69. Id.
70. Id. at *2.
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Pepsico case.' However, the court rejected Schlage's argument that
Whyte should be enjoined from taking his new job because he would
inevitably disclose Schlage's trade secrets." The court said that
applying the IDD would essentially turn Whyte's confidentiality
agreement into an after-the-fact non-compete agreement.73 The court
stated that when a confidentiality agreement exists, the IDD would
create an "imperceptible shift in bargaining power" upon the start of
employment, resulting in an after-the-fact change into a covenant not
to compete. Additionally, the court said that the IDD ran counter to
California's strong public policy of employee mobility. 5 The court
concluded that the IDD "cannot be used as a substitute for proving
actual or threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.
' '7
Although it settled the issue of the IDD's adoption in California,
Schlage Lock Co. still leaves equally important questions
unanswered. Specifically, although the court noted that threatened
misappropriation could be enjoined, it did not discuss or define
"threatened" because it was unnecessary; the standard of review
required that the facts be construed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, in this case the party seeking denial of the
injunction.7 Indeed, the court expressly stated that "our decision is
not a final adjudication on the issue of actual or threatened
misappropriation., 7' The court noted that there was evidence to
support both sides.7 ' Therefore, if the court below had issued an
injunction due to threatened misappropriation, the court of appeal
might have upheld that decision, even with identical facts. In sum,
while Schlage Lock Co. rejects any use of the IDD to obtain an
injunction outside of the "threatened" language of the UTSA, it does
not give any guidance as to where the UTSA ends and the IDD
begins." Therefore, employers and their departing employees are still
left guessing what the standards are for the possibility of enjoining the
employee's future employment.
71. Id. at *11.
72. Id. at "1.
73. Id. at *12.
74. Id. at *13 (quoting Earthweb Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 311 (S.D.N.Y.
1999), remanded on other grounds, 205 F.3d 1322 (2d Cir. 2000), aff'd after remand, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 1446 (2d. Cir. May 18, 2000)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at *14.
77. Id. at *9-10.
78. Id. at *10.
79. Id.
80. See id.
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E. Employee Mobility and California Business and Professions Code
Section 16600
California Business and Professions Code 16600 ("B&P 16600")
stands in tension with an expansive version of the IDD.8 It states that
"every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a
lawful profession, or business of any kind is: to that extent void."82
Courts in California have consistently construed this to be the
codification of California's "strong public policy" for employee
mobility and against covenants not to compete.83 Additionally,
California courts have used B&P 16600 as the basis for explicitly
rejecting the "rule of reasonableness" that many other states apply to
covenants not to compete.
84
Because B&P 16600 only restricts non-compete covenants, it
does not prevent the adoption of the IDD, which has been used only
in the context of trade secret misappropriation. However, B&P 16600
does remain a well-recognized statement of California's commitment
to employee mobility and the right of workers to chose their business
or profession.85 The California Supreme Court has stated:
Equity will to the fullest extent protect the property rights of
employers in their trade secrets and otherwise, but public
policy and natural justice require that equity should also be
solicitous for the right inherent in all people, not fettered by
negative covenants upon their part to the contrary, to follow
any of the common occupations of life. Every individual
possesses as a form of property, the right to pursue any
calling, business or profession he may choose. A former
employee has the right to engage in a competitive business
for himself and to enter into competition with his former
employer, even for the business of those who had formerly
been the customers of his former employer, provided such
competition is fairly and legally conducted.86
This is considered by some to be a significant reason for the
existence and success of the Silicon Valley as a world leader in high
technology industries.
At least one proponent of the IDD's adoption in California
81. Cal. Bus. & Prof. 16600 (2001).
82. Id.
83. See e.g. Scott v. Snelling Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
84. See e.g. Bosley Med. Group v. Abramson, 161 Cal. App. 3d 284, 288 (1984).
85. Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal. 2d 104, 110 (1944).
86. Id.
87. Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 619-24
(1999).
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attacks the origins of B&P 16600, arguing that it has been misapplied
and interpreted incorrectly.' Mr. Norris argues that B&P 16600 was
essentially a codification of the common law as a "convenient
statement" of it, and as such should not be interpreted rigidly, but
should change with the times.' However, the fact that B&P 16600
has changed with the times is evidenced by one of its relatively few
exceptions, which allows restrictive covenants when they are needed
to protect the trade secrets of the employer.' It could be argued that
such a big exception, especially in the context of trade secrets, should
give support to the adoption of the IDD. However, even with this
exception, the codification of B&P 16600 and the related case law
leave no doubt that California places a high value on and has a strong
tradition of protecting employee mobility.9'
Additionally, as a practical matter, B&P 16600 is a success. Not
only does it recognize the right of employee mobility, it has been
credited as one of the reasons for Silicon Valley being a world
technology leader.92
F. Other Jurisdictions and the IDD
Several other jurisdictions have considered and adopted the
IDD.93  Others have rejected it.94  The elements considered and
standards used by the courts can vary greatly, and some are even in
direct opposition to each other.9 For example, in Conagra Inc. v.
Tyson Foods, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that a former
employer was prohibited from suing under the IDD if there was not a
88. Trenton H. Norris, Why California Should Adopt 'Inevitable Disclosure',
Intellectual Property Magazine (October, 1998).
89. Id.
90. Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 242 (1965); Metro Traffic
Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 22 Cal. App. 4th 853, 859 (1994).
91. See Continental Car-Na-Var Corp., 24 Cal. 2d at 110.
92. Gilson, supra n. 87 at 619-20; See Jay L. Koh, From Hoops to Hard Drives: An
Accession Law Approach to the Inevitable Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, 48 Am. U. L.
Rev. 271, 284 n.80 (1998) (citing Annalee Saxenian, Regional Advantage, Culture and
Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (1994)).
93. See e.g. Cardinal Freight, 987 S.W.2d 642 (Ark. 1999); Novell, 46 U.S.P.Q.2D at
1216; Solutec, 88 Wash. App. 1067; APAC Teleservices, 985 F. Supp. at 857; Southwestern
Energy, 955 F. Supp. at 1085; National Starch, 530 A.2d at 33; La Calhene, 938 F. Supp. at
531; Lumex, 919 F. Supp. at 633-34; Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1457; Uncle B's Bakery, 920 F.
Supp. at 1435-36.
94. Bayer Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111; Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d 467 (1st
Cir. 1995); IBM v. Bonyhard, 962 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1992); FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote
Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
95. Compare Conagra Inc. v. Tyson Foods Inc., 30 S.W.3d at 725 (2000), with
Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
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confidentiality agreement. 9 However, in Earthweb Inc. v. Schlack,
the Second Circuit ruled that an employer waived the use of the IDD
because it required employees to sign a confidentiality agreement.97
One scholar has identified four different approaches that courts
have taken in applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine." These
approaches are: 1) a general fact-intensive analysis, 2) looking at bad
faith on the part of the departing employee or the new employer, 3)
limiting the application of the IDD to highly technical employment,
and 4) an objective look at the competition, coupled with an analysis
of the similarity of the new position.9
Another scholar has analyzed the different ways that the courts
apply the IDD by looking at a number of factors that the courts have
considered, rather than separating the decisions into doctrinal
categories. The eight factors that D. Peter Harvey identifies as having
been used by different courts in applying the IDD are:
(1) Is the new employer a competitor? (2) What is the scope
of the defendant's new job? (3) Has the employee been less
than candid about his new position? (4) Has plaintiff clearly
identified the trade secrets which are at risk? (5) Has actual
trade secret misappropriation already occurred? (6) Did the
employee sign a non-disclosure and/or non-competition
agreement? (7) Does the new employer have a policy
against use of others' trade secrets? (8) Is it possible to
"sanitize" the employee's new position?
These four doctrinal categories and eight factors are gleaned
from cases applying the IDD, and illustrate the complexity of the
considerations involved in the IDD. This, along with a lack of
standards for applying the IDD, has led to inconsistent application
and results in jurisdictions adopting the doctrine.
II
The IDD and Its Increasing Use
Critics of the IDD claim that it is nothing more than a non-
competition covenant masquerading as judicial doctrine.''
96. Conagra Inc., 30 S.W.3d at 725.
97. Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
98. For a complete discussion of these categories, as well as their respective benefits
and disadvantages, see Koh, supra n. 92 at 286-98.
99. Id.
100. Maxxim Medical, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 786 (quoting D. Peter Harvey, Inevitable
Trade Secret Misappropriation after PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 537 PLI/PAT 199, 226-27
(1998).
101. Bayer, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 (holding that, absent a nontrivial showing of actual
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Detractors of the doctrine have also likened the IDD to modern day
indentured servitude. 2 The following problems associated with the
doctrine demonstrate why some courts have cautioned against
creating "a conclusive presumption that a former employee, having
had access to trade secrets, will necessarily engage in wrongdoing
(intentional or accidental) by using those secrets in his or her next
similar employment.'
1 °0 3
A. The IDD Allows Employers to Jump the Gun in Protecting
Trade Secrets
"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear
showing, carries the burden of persuasion.""0 4 The states that have
adopted the UTSA have already lowered the preliminary injunction
requirements regarding trade secret claims by removing
misappropriation as an element of a trade secret claim when it is
"threatened."'0'5 In these states, misappropriation cannot be part of
the claim because, being only threatened, it has not yet happened.
The standard is dangerously lowered even further when, as in
Electro Optical, a court interprets the IDD to mean that an injunction
is appropriate when the new employment is "likely to result" in the
disclosure of a former employer's trade secrets.'"6  Whereas
"threatened" suggests some imminence and unavoidability, "likely"
would seem to suggest a standard closer to preponderance. For
example, the court would not need to look for an actual instance of an
employee threatening, implicitly or explicitly, to use a previous
employer's trade secrets. Additionally, the court in Electro Optical
adopted the IDD without discussion or further guidance. 7
This relaxation of standards will allow employers to act
prematurely in obtaining preliminary injunctions against former
or threatened use or disclosure, the IDD creates a "de facto covenant not to compete");
Schlage Lock Co., 2002 WL 31040309 at *12 ("we agree that the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure 'creates a de facto covenant not to compete."') (quoting Bayer, 72 F. Supp. 2d
at 1120).
102. See e.g. Cyprus Foote, 899 F. Supp. at 1482; Johanna L. Edelstein, Student
Author, Intellectual Slavery?: The Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets, 26
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 717 (Spring 1996).
103. KLA-Tencor Corp. v. Rigg, Case No. CV 787420, slip op. at 8 (Sup. Ct. Cal.
2000).
104. Maxxim Medical, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 778.
105. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.2(a) (2001).
106. Electro Optical, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 660.
107. Id.
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employers. It reaches far below the "inevitable" standard used by the
court in Pepsico,'8 and abandons the stringent requirements that
California courts place on allowing noncompete agreements.
Furthermore, it also abandons the standards that courts have
historically used in deciding whether to issue preliminary
injunctions."°9 Such a standard, allowing an employer to prevent a
former employee from taking a new position based only on a
likelihood or preponderance of whether misappropriation will occur
in the future, is inappropriate for a remedy like a preliminary
injunction."'
B. The IDD Can Be Used as a Sword Instead of a Shield
The IDD is intended to help protect trade secrets, but it also has
the potential to unfairly affect employees. The threat of litigation
from IDD can be used to stop employees from leaving their present
jobs."' Companies like the U.S. arm of French telecom company
Alcatel have been criticized for using the IDD to aggressively go after
former employees, competitors, and even the venture capital backers
of their competitors."2 Critics say that the IDD has been used to stifle
startups, illegally restrain competition, and even impact the
availability of funds, affecting regional economic development. " '
One such critic, technology giant Cisco Systems, has never used the
IDD against a competitor because it believes that the use of IDD is
leading "down a dangerous path."".. Cisco associate general counsel
Mark Chandler believes that the law "should be based on proof
rather than supposition, and that the IDD could chill high tech
entrepreneurship."".5
The potential for the IDD to be abused in this way is great, and
can have an adverse impact on innovation. In a recent case, a startup
paid four million dollars in legal bills to defend an IDD claim in
which Novell had obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting work
108. Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1269.
109. Maxxim Medical, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 778.
110. Id. (discussing strict requirements for issuance of preliminary injunction).
111. Miles J. Feldman, Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable Information: Trade
Secrets and the Employment Relationship, 9 High Tech L.J. 151, 172 (1994).
112. Fred Donovan, Remember the Alamo: Texas Firm Battles to Survive in Trade
Secret Dispute, 21 Fiber Optics News, no. 5 (Jan 29, 2001).
113. Id.
114. Vikas Bajaj, Alcatel Guards its Trade Secrets: Lashed By Industry Critics, VP
Makes No Apologies for Lawsuits, The Dallas Morning News 1H (Sept. 3, 2000) (quoting
Cisco Associate General Counsel Mark Chandler).
115. Id.
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on a software product."6 The program code in question cost only $2.2
million to develop."7 The overall cost to develop this product was
increased almost 200 percent by the litigation, which will have the
effect of driving investment capital elsewhere.
The uncertainty and irregular application of the IDD is another
way that the doctrine favors employers."8 The disparity in resources
makes it easier and more worthwhile for employers to file suit against
former employees to stop them from competing in similar fields. " 9
C. The IDD Imposes an Unanticipated Non-compete Agreement
Another criticism of the IDD is that it creates an after-the-fact
non-compete agreement on departing employees.12' The doctrine
allows a former employer to restrict an employee's future
employment, essentially imposing a non-compete agreement onto the
employee. This is unfair to the employee, regardless of whether he
has signed a non-disclosure agreement, because it was not a term of
his employment and he was not compensated in exchange for it. If an
agreement not to compete was not adopted at the outset of
employment, the court's imposition of one on a departing employee is
a potential windfall for the employer, who does not have to
compensate the employee in return. The employer can essentially get
a free ride on the back of the IDD at the expense of the former
employee, when it is the employee who is often least able to afford it.
Some courts have noticed the inequity in this situation, and have
stated that covenants not to compete should be bargained for out in
the open, rather than imposed after the fact.' 2'
D. The IDD Makes Non-Disclosure Agreements a Catch-22 in
Unsettled Districts
The IDD may be and often is invoked when the departing
employee has signed a written non-compete or non-disclosure
agreement.' 22 However, in another jurisdiction, the court ruled the
116. Essex, supra n. 28.
117. Id.
118. Koh, supra n. 92, at 305 n. 206.
119. Id.
120. Bayer, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1111 (holding that, absent a nontrivial showing of actual
or threatened use or disclosure, the IDD creates a "de facto covenant not to compete");
Schlage Lock Co., 2002 WL 31040309 at *12 ("we agree that the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure 'creates a de facto covenant not to compete."') (quoting Bayer, 72 F. Supp. 2d
at 1120). See also Koh, supra n. 92, at 285 n.79.
121. Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
122. See e.g., Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1264.
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opposite - that an employer may waive its rights under the IDD if it
has required an employee to sign a restrictive covenant.123 In
Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, a New York court refused to issue an
injunction where the employee had signed a nondisclosure agreement
with the former employer.124 The court held that the IDD was
unavailable to the plaintiff hecause it had entered into a specific
contract, and was therefore limited to a strict interpretation of that
contract . 5
The Earthweb case highlights one of the dilemmas employers
and employees face when trying to gauge their specific rights under
such an unsettled doctrine. If an employer requires an employee to
sign a nondisclosure or noncompete clause at the start of
employment, it may later be precluded from asserting a claim
premised on the IDD. However, if an employer does not require such
a writing of its employees, it may leave itself otherwise unprotected if
the IDD does not apply. Additionally, the absence of a written
confidentiality agreement can be used to show the lack of reasonable
measures taken to protect a trade secret, and weigh in favor of a court
finding that no trade secrets even exist.26 Therefore, in forums where
the IDD or its application is unsettled, employers and employees
must make decisions at the beginning of employment that may later
affect their rights in unforeseen and unintended ways.
E. The Doctrine of Negative Trade Secrets Exacerbates the
Problems of the IDD
The doctrine of negative trade secrets essentially allows the
knowledge of what not to do to be treated as a trade secret as well.1
27
The doctrine of negative trade secrets has gained acceptance since the
UTSA and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition dropped
the continuous use requirement for trade secrets.2 8 Although there
are relatively few reported cases which have adopted protection for
negative trade secrets, they seem to be specifically allowed by the
comments to section 69 of the Restatement, which notes that the use
requirement was dropped because it "places in doubt protection for
123. Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 311-12.
126. See Conagra Inc. v. Tyson Foods Inc., 30 S.W.3d 725, 727 (2000).
127. Nathan Hamler, Student Author, The Impending Merger of the Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine and Negative Trade Secrets: Is Trade Secrets Law Headed in the Right
Direction? 25 Iowa J. Corp. L. 383, 398 (2000).
128. Id. at 400.
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so-called 'negative' information that teaches conduct to be avoided,
such as knowledge that a particular process or technique is unsuitable
for commercial use." '129 As this doctrine gains popularity and
acceptance, its intersection with the IDD will broaden the IDD
considerably, 3° making it more important for the scope and
requirements of the IDD to be properly defined.
F. The IDD Hinders Employee Mobility and Innovation
Courts should also more thoroughly explore the employee's right
to mobility, as California does. 3' The right of a person to pursue the
work he sees fit is correctly recognized by the California courts to be
an important property right closely connected to fundamental issues
of personhood and freedom,'32 but in many cases this right is not
discussed or balanced against the trade secret rights of the plaintiff.'33
As the court in Schlage Lock Co. stated, "[t]he decisions rejecting the
inevitable disclosure doctrine correctly balance competing public
policies of employee mobility and protection of trade secrets.",1
The IDD necessarily restricts employee mobility. Restricting
employee mobility will hinder innovation.'35 Employee mobility has
been credited as one of the reasons for the success of Silicon Valley,
and the lack of such mobility has been cited by empirical studies as a
reason for the decline of other high-tech areas.'36 Application of the
IDD could provide incentive for employees to consciously avoid
exposure to trade secrets, seeing contact with such information as a
future liability to their mobility and career outside of their present
employment. "7 Courts should also recognize that employee mobility
also benefits the former employer. The other side of an employer's
liability in departing employees is that same employer's gain from its
hiring of other company's employees.'38 Additionally, courts should
recognize the interest of the new employer in hiring qualified
employees. Although not often mentioned, the new employer has an
129. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39, cmt. b (1995).
130. Hamler, supra n. 127 at 401.
131. Supra pt. 1(d) (discussing California's policies regarding employee mobility).
132. Id.
133. See e.g., Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1269; B.F. Goodrich, 192 N.E.2d at 105; Electro
Optical, 76 Cal. App. at 660.
134. 2002 WL 31040309 at *12.
135. Edelstein, 26 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. at 733.
136. Koh, supra n. 92, at 284 n. 80 (citing Annalee Saxenian, Regional Advantage,
Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (1994)).
137. Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 435 (Pa. 1960).
138. See Gilson, supra n. 87 at 619-620.
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interest in the outcome of litigation because businesses need to hire
experienced and skilled employees to replace those that leave.
III
Proposals for Application of the IDD
A. The IDD Should Be Specifically Defined and Narrowly
Applied
The court in Earthweb Inc. v. Schlack correctly noted that "in its
purest form, the inevitable disclosure doctrine treads an exceedingly
narrow path through judicially disfavored territory," and said that,
"[a]bsent evidence of actual misappropriation by an employee, the
doctrine should be applied in only the rarest of cases." ''  Even the
Pepsico case counsels restraint of the IDD, emphasizing that "the
mere fact that a person assumed a similar position at a competitor
does not, without more, make it 'inevitable that he will use or
disclose.., trade secret information.". 4. Cases like Electro Optical
go well beyond this by converting "inevitable" into "likely".1
4
'
Because California places great priority on the mobility of
employees, and because this public policy benefits the state,'42
California has rejected the IDD, even though the issue of threatened
misappropriation remains.
The use of the IDD in all jurisdictions should be similarly limited
to situations where the disclosure is proven to be literally imminent or
is actually inevitable, i.e. incapable of being avoided. This protection
against a lowering of the standards used in applying the IDD is
necessary because of the nature of the doctrine.'43 Specifically, the
IDD allows an injunction to issue for trade secret misappropriation
when none has occurred or is even alleged. Such a drastic remedy
should not be granted in speculative circumstances, as the Electro
Optical court did by using a "likely" standard.14 '
Use of the IDD should be limited to two situations: where the
disclosure is proved to be literally threatened, or where disclosure is
actually inevitable, i.e., incapable of being avoided. An example of
139. Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
140. Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1268 (quoting AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1207
(7th Cir. 1987)).
141. Electro Optical, 76 Cal. App. at 660.
142. Gilson, supra n. 87 at 219-20.
143. See supra section II.
144. Electro Optical, 76 Cal. App. at 660.
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such a standard is to require a finding that future disclosure is
incapable of being avoided, or in other words, that it truly is
inevitable. Furthermore, any adoption of the IDD should come with
detailed instructions and standards to prevent ambiguity. Creating
uncertainties about the merit and chances for success of certain claims
increases the cost and likelihood of litigation, as well as the potential
for abuse and the likelihood of inconsistent outcomes.1 4 5 Any
adoption of such an unsettled and potentially far-reaching doctrine
should come with a thorough discussion of the requirements and
limits of the doctrine as adopted by that jurisdiction, and should also
include a discussion of the rationale of the court in adopting the form
of the doctrine that it chooses.
B. Alternative Remedies
California could also temper the harshness of the IDD with
alternative remedies. The IDD has been criticized for its "inadequate
and inconsistent all-or-nothing remedies., 146  Currently, the usual
response of the courts is an issuance of or refusal to issue an
injunction prohibiting or limiting new employment.1 47 However, there
are less severe alternatives than the court could use in crafting
remedies if and when inevitable disclosure is found.
C. Compensating Enjoined Employees
In return for granting an injunction using the IDD, courts should
order former employers to compensate employees who are enjoined
from taking new work, provided there was no noncompete
agreement. If a court, at a former employer's request, takes away the
right to find a new job in one's chosen field, a property right
recognized by the California Supreme Court,4 8 then that employer
should have to compensate the former employee as a matter of
fairness and equity. The employer's windfall in the granting of a
noncompete agreement is essentially unjust enrichment, since the
employer has received something of value for which it did not bargain
or provide compensation. Under contract law, unjust enrichment is
compensable even in the absence of a contract. An additional benefit
and safeguard that comes from such compensation is that former
145. Suellen Lowry, Student Author, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes:
Dissolutions of Concurrent Property Interests, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 519, 531 (1988).
146. Koh, supra n. 92, at 299-304.
147. Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1269.
148. See Continental Car-Na-Var Corp., 24 Cal. 2d at 110.
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employers might be less likely to abuse the IDD by pursuing bogus or
harassing claims if they would have to pay the fair value of what they
are asking for.
D. Lenient Restoration of Trade Secret Status
It is well settled that a trade secret "once lost is lost forever.', 14 9
Since the possibility of disclosure and permanent loss of a trade secret
is an issue in applying the IDD, courts should be stricter in guidance
but permissive in action. They should be lenient in restoring a trade
secret if it is used by the new employer, but not released to the public.
Because trade secrets, if used by former employees, would
presumably be closely held by the new employer as well, putting the
genie back in the bottle with respect to the "secret" would be far
easier than in cases where the trade secret information has been
publicly disseminated. For example, if a court found that a departing
employee misappropriated a former employer's trade secret, the
court could rule that the discovery of the trade secret by others did
not destroy the secret, as long as the trade secret was not publicly
disseminated. The court could then enjoin the new employer and
anyone else who had inappropriately discovered the trade secret from
further use of the secret. If, however, the new employer had
disseminated the secret so widely that restoration of trade secret
status was impossible, then damages would be the proper remedy.
E. Ongoing Discovery Obligations
In some situations the courts could fashion ongoing discovery
obligations instead of enjoining a departing employee from accepting
a new job. That is what the court did in Bayer v. Roche Molecular
Systems. It checked up on the new employee and employer, and gave
the former employer some peace of mind. In Bayer, the court refused
to adopt the IDD and enjoin the employee from his new employment;
instead, it ordered the defendant to submit to ongoing discovery
obligations such as depositions and document production in order to
ensure protection of the plaintiff's trade secrets.50 This would be a
particularly appropriate remedy when the court finds that disclosure
may be likely, but not necessarily inevitable.
F. Punitive Damages
The courts could also create harsher penalties for trade secret
149. Taiwan Giant, 730 F.2d at 63.
150. Bayer, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1119-22.
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misappropriation that would reduce the incentives for departing
employees and their new employers to use a former employer's trade
secrets. The courts already use treble damages and punitive damages
in other areas of law to lessen the incentives for potential wrongdoers.
Treble damages could be used for this purpose in the trade secret
context as well.
IV
Conclusion
The mere adoption or rejection of the IDD is not a tough issue.
The vast majority of states, including California, have already
adopted the UTSA, which specifically allows for courts to enjoin
"threatened misappropriation."'' The IDD is simply a way for courts
to determine what rises to the level of threatened misappropriation.
Taken literally, the IDD would only apply to cases that are truly
"inevitable", that is to say where disclosure is shown to be absolutely
incapable of being avoided. However, some courts have applied the
IDD much more broadly, using it to convert non-disclosure
agreements into non-compete agreements, and by substituting
inevitability with likelihood.
Given the success of California's strong public policy for
employee mobility, a "threatened disclosure" under the UTSA
should be interpreted to mean a disclosure that is actually threatened,
as opposed to merely a likely or possible one. Only those rare
situations where disclosure of a former employer's trade secrets is in
fact "inevitable" should be included in the actual threatened
disclosure category. In such circumstances, the courts should enjoin
the new employment only to the extent that it is necessary. The
courts should refuse to expand the IDD or the threatened
misappropriation beyond this strict standard.
The proper standards for inevitability and the definition of
threatened misappropriation remain unclear in many jurisdictions,
including California. However, through a narrow application of the
IDD and the use of creative and well-tailored remedies, the courts
will be able to determine these standards on a case by case basis while
properly balancing and protecting all of the legitimate interests
involved.
151. Supra n. 5 and accompanying text.
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